Monday, August 23, 2021
on “belief”
placeholder for upcoming development
Aug. 26
But my sense of “upcoming” three days ago got pushed into the future. Belief is apposite (funny word, to my ear) for thinking about confidence in the credibility of one’s stances prior to another person’s skepticism.
A position implies validity implicature that a positioner should feel confident about, before offering the position.
In common terms, one presumes to know what they’re talking about. So, belief that that is true—that the positioner has unexpressed good reason for his view (prior to being challenged to justify his position)—makes belief a posture or pretense about knowing. That led me to clarify my position on what better-oriented action consists in, as background for understanding good reason relative to interests of action.
Meanwhile (the past couple of days), I wrote “an individual pluralism of conceptual interests,” which unwittingly dissolved my concern about credibility—which really is best addressed relative to others’ specific concerns about specific themes irt the terms that they use.
Intent to dwell technically with the notion of belief—in quote marks: as what one means by using the term generally—remains, as part of interest in the notion of knowing and better-oriented action, both being part of a sense of proximal rationality, which I distinguish from good reason for action.
For example, I easily feel I have good reason to do something, though no one is going to ask me to justify it because nobody knows I’m doing it. Rationalization is always an observer-relative (or other interested) activity. You might claim that rationality just is good reason for action, but I distinguish employable reason and rationality: justifiability of the employment to or for others, which is always relative to an other's understanding—e.g., colleagues versus acquaintances versus children versus casual observers—and is oriented by desire for mutually determined satisfaction that justification is clear enough or cogent enough, whether or not the other accepts my case.
Proximal rationality is usually all that persons want from each other.
I would distinguish that from professional interest in rationality which pertains to systemically culpable public life. That’s distinct from primordial interest in rationality which pertains to the conceptual implicatures of standardly academic discourses.
Aren’t you fascinated? (Not).
