Sunday, May 1, 2011

differencing: being variably a part

1 | Variability shows in varying. I witness varying. I vary, I do varying. Through varying, a sense of variability may emerge, refineable into a conception which may be emblemized by a concept of variability. Differences belong to varying, emergent differentiations belong to a variability. Differentiating belongs to varying. The differences in/of differentiating can be joined as a notion of differencing.

2 | Enacting a result isn’t known as act until given the result of enacting. Enacting results.

To say that an act results is less accurate, since an act depends on acting: actualizing an intention. A behavior isn’t an act. Life behaves, but intention belongs to intelligence high enough to express decidability—which includes not deciding, i.e., deciding to not act. Primal freedom may be expressed in not acting (common with 18 month old children and teens), as well as expressed (enacted) in expressiveness (a representation of expressing as such).

3 | I move—to somewhere, but the moving is the resulting. Movings are distinguishable by different resultings. But the moving-with-result is a singular enacting[-a result], actualization, to which grammatical representation gives differentiations internal to the singularity.

4 | It’s enacting a result that constitutes the act. Enacting a result behaviorally gives way to a result, singularly enacting-a-result. But enacting afterward (after the enactment) may gain (have gained) a difference in the singularity of the act between enacting and result. Retrospectively, it’s obvious that the difference between enacting and result was intrinsic to the act, and likewise all acts are intrinsically differentiable as—may be differenced into—enacting and result. Through words, grammatical form gives differentiation to the retrospection, representing the singularity [1] of enacting [2] a result. But enacting-a-result is a singular phenomenon.

5 | I act, representable as me acting or saying, oddly, “I” acted (i.e., something different from saying “I acted”). To say “I acted” is to express a difference between the enacting and the actor: myself, “I,” as having acted. A stance is taken in saying (retropectively) “I acted,” essentially requiring no more information than for someone who says of me “He acted.”

6 | Yet, we both know the acting differently at the same time: I move, to you as the phenomenon of there being movement (behavior) presumably intended. To me, the intending isn’t presumed in retrospectively knowing my behavior was an intended move, because I moved.

7 | I may have intended to move differently and know that immediately after recognizing how my result is an unanticipated behavior, not what I intended. How that may have happened is somethng to explain. I may recognize that it was as if it wasn’t my move; I didn’t intend that move. (So, there could be major explaining to do.) But the other can’t know that difference unless I express it (and, if needed, explain). The behavior’s normal meaning is to presume it was intended as the behavior resulted.

8 | The I/me (enacting/actor) difference is available to both of us—actor and observer—but available differently, not just because it’s my action and not yours, but because I can witness a relationship between represented intention and represented result that is normally without presumption for me (though I may be mistaken), while you have to presume, pending interaction about the act, but are likely not mistaken about what the behavior normally means.

9 | You presume that normal meaning applies in “this” case.

I say I didn’t mean that, though the action (disputably characterizable) is (was) what I intended (I claim). I intended something else than normal meaning by acting as I anticipated. Resulting behavior can have multiple meanings, obviously. But how so isn’t obvious (and I’m not going to press analytical points now).

You say the behavior should not be accepted as meaning anything other than what it normally means.

I say that variability of meaning is fair, and “here is why I meant something different from what is normally meant,” followed by the explanation.

10| That might be an enriching experience or explanation of what is thereby seen as a betrayal, though I didn’t intend betrayal. I should have anticipated that the “abnormal” meaning would be read as betrayal? Why should I have anticipated that? Maybe you’re right. Or maybe I aptly expected you read differently, but you didn’t. We each may have something to learn.

11 | As we may readily distinguish, a mind is intangible, called into translations, calling for translation. A mind’s beyond embodiment, in that enacting may be validly “abnormal,” while the presence of one’s day is immersed in an atmosphere of normalities, maybe plural atmospheres of what’s normal (in a studio vs. in an office; in a seminar vs. someone else’s home).

12 | Embodiment is a very psychal manifold, potentially a very manifold psychality. Inworldness is very manifold. So, mindality, psychality includes the notion of mind as intangibly apart from a world in which one’s a part. Apartness may belong to inworldness as a variable, differencing, manifold worldliness potentially belonging to inworldness itself, intangible complement of scenic tangibility in an embodied (our atmospherically normal) presence: differentiable, differenced—from presence of one’s life to oneself generally (cognitively-transcendental complement to trOpical minding: gravities of given ideas, as if tangible in their mental appeal).

13 | Making a difference coined as differencing seems to me better than “differentiating.” Distinguishing may be about differencing, but is usually about singularizing: discerning an instance distinct from others, less as a matter of the difference than as identifying an instance of something, individuating in the trivial sense of a point being distinguished from others. Of course, distinguishing can mean either (both?). Differencing can be applied to distinguishing.

14 | Differencing is typified in the enacted differentiability of enaction into enacting and result, whereby a result is distinguishable from the resulting. Differencing action into acting and result is an act of differencing applied to action as (resulting in) distinguished result; or distinction between result and resulting; or differentiation of result and resulting.

15 | Differencing is the keynote of analytical activity. More pertinent differences irt a context allows more possibilities of variance, more ways into translation or interpretation. Capability for differencing can always grow, especially through seeking unexpected emergences, other stances, exploration of mysteries, etc. Many persons don’t gain desire for lots of differencing, which belongs to analytical interest. In particular, my differences of Self, self, [inter]personality, persona, and stance express an interest in psychal presence (appreciative and reflective) which many persons wouldn’t find engaging.

So it goes.