Saturday, February 10, 2007

discursive communication
as appropriative interfacing

A momentary intent this morning to revise a typographical error in my brief discussion of the "theory"-"practice" relationship, Nov. 2004, became a substantial revision of that still-short discussion (after the third paragraph).

Consider the notion of interface there as something axially dependent on communicative action. The rendered "manifold of interfaces" isn't an overt focus as such, but the whole of it (a holism rendered relatively briefly, but which is vertiginously connotative to me—without overtones of mystification!) can be regarded as a sense of context for doing philosophy of social science in a Habermasian spirit.

Yet, inquiry into the conceptuality of "Theory"—e.g., interfacing epistemic and ethical inquiry philosophically—can't be completely modeled as communicative action, though presentation of inquiry always is communicative in intent (if not efficacy). Inquiry presumes content and means, bearing representations that may effect more inquiry (and grammatical traces of that such as this statement). But the self-efficacy of the work is only figuratively a "communication" with oneself, as if dwelling in woods is having words with trees.

Though, indeed, thinking can be profoundly modeled as reflection—as an interplay that is often much like an internalization of dialogue roles—the manifold mirrorplay of thinking emerges from the thinking itself less wholly as reflectivity (let alone as discretely dialogal) than as thinking emerging from itself, potentially involving the whole of capability, not merely what's linguistic. (A flowering may enfold into itself as woods.)

Thinking finds its representational order, from which resultant understanding finds presentation, which may be linguistic or not, as the glyphicality of understanding may involve any representational means (a topology of wooding flowers), though here the gardening is linguistic.